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Introduction
We thank Sander Greenland and Albert Hofman (hereaf-
ter abbreviated GH) for their comments [1] on our paper 
[2], and the Editor for giving us the opportunity to respond. 
We have made an effort to understand the foundations for 
GH’s critique, hoping that we don’t misrepresent them in our 
response below. We first summarize and add clarity to the 
main points of our paper.
Our main points
In our experience, multiple testing is surrounded by confu-
sion. This confusion seems to stem primarily from a dif-
ficulty to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant multi-
plicity adjustments. In our paper we have argued that
• the frequentist framework is unable to distinguish 
between relevant and irrelevant multiplicity adjustments; 
from the frequentist perspective all possible collections 
of tests seem equally valid to adjust for.
• the Bayesian framework, by using posterior probabili-
ties as a basis for inference, offers a clear and coherent 
distinction. Within this framework it is relevant to adjust 
for those tests that are associated with the test under con-
sideration. Here, we defined two tests to be associated 
if either the hypotheses, or the data sets, of the tests are 
associated. Within the Bayesian framework, the associa-
tion between hypotheses is encoded by joint prior distri-
butions on these.
We have shown that this formality of the Bayesian frame-
work helps to reason about the set of relevant adjustments 
in the light of background context, which we expressed by 
means of directed acyclic graphs. We noted, however, that it 
may be hard to specify joint prior distributions, and that the 
set of relevant adjustments may be extremely large. Thus, 
for practical purposes we proposed a compromise, where 
the formal statistical analysis is done within the standard 
frequentist framework (e.g. by computing p values or confi-
dence intervals), and the adjustment for multiplicity is done 
informally, by reasoning qualitatively about the association 
of hypotheses. In particular, we have recommended survey-
ing the available evidence and making it available as part of 
the ‘Discussion’ section of applied epidemiological papers. 
One step further would be to borrow information across tests 
or comparisons. In that sense, we view GH’s favored hierar-
chical modeling approach as being in line with (and a further 
formalization of) our recommendations.
Our reasoning on directed acyclic graphs has further led 
us to draw two conclusions that may not seem immediately 
intuitive. First: when testing two hypotheses on related data 
set, the Bayesian framework generally requires adjustment 
of the first test for the second test, even if the two hypoth-
eses are unrelated. This is so because the test statistic of 
the first hypothesis is a collider between the first hypothesis 
and the test statistic of the second test. Second: when doing 
a fishing expedition on unrelated hypotheses and data sets, 
there is no need to make any multiplicity adjustment within 
the Bayesian framework, since the posterior for any of the 
hypothesis does not, in this case, depend on the test statistics 
of the other tests or on the selection mechanism induced by 
the data fishing. We would like to emphasize that this is only 
so provided that a correct Bayesian analysis is considered, 
and that standard frequentist measures (e.g. p values) are not 
necessarily justified under an (informal) frequentist analysis. * Arvid Sjölander  arvid.sjolander@ki.se
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GH’s critique
As we understand it, GH’s critique mainly concerns five 
issues; frequentism versus Bayesianism, formal versus infor-
mal adjustment, information summary versus decision mak-
ing, hierarchical models, and context and causality.
Frequentism versus Bayesianism
GH argue that our dichotomization between ‘frequentist’ 
and ‘Bayesian’ frameworks is overly simplistic. He writes: 
‘There is far more in our toolkit than the extremes of fre-
quentist and Bayesian’, and ‘There is no singular frequentist 
or Bayesian philosophy or methodology any more than there 
is just one form of (say) Christianity’.
We agree with GH on this point. However, the fact that 
there is a strong heterogeneity within Christianity does not 
imply that anything would reasonably qualify as Chris-
tian, or that it would be meaningless to make comparisons 
between Christianity and, say, Islam. In our paper we (some-
what implicitly) defined ‘frequentism’ as the collection of 
methods that treat parameters as fixed, and use the distribu-
tion of data, given parameters, as basis for inference. We 
defined ‘Bayesianism’ as the collections of methods that 
treat parameters as random, and use the distribution of the 
parameters, given data, as basis for inference. Clearly, there 
are many variations of and hybrids between these, such as 
mixed effects models, empirical Bayesianism etc. However, 
despite this plethora of methods, epidemiological practice 
today is absolutely dominated by the extreme frequentist 
end of the spectrum, where all parameters are treated as 
fixed and inference is solely based on the distribution of 
data, given parameters, as in Bygren et al. [3]. There may 
be acceptable reasons for this conformity, such as a genuine 
consensus that ‘extreme frequentism’ is, by and large, a rea-
sonable scientific attitude. There may also be less acceptable 
reasons, such as tradition or ignorance about the alternatives. 
The underlying reasons do not matter much for our discus-
sion though; what matters is that most epidemiologists think 
and act within the (extreme) frequentist framework, as we 
have defined it, and that this framework obscures discussions 
around multiplicity adjustments. In particular, regardless of 
the above dichotomization, the key point is that the poste-
rior distribution provides a formal tool for distinguishing 
between relevant and irrelevant multiplicity adjustments.
Formal versus informal adjustment
GH tentatively accept our proposal for informal adjust-
ment in studies where ‘the analysis targets only one focused 
research question represented by a few closely related 
statistical hypotheses or parameters, and all analyses and 
estimates are reported with equal emphasis and detail’. 
However, they reject the proposal for studies where ‘there 
are several interdependent parameters or hypotheses in the 
analysis’, and for studies that are ‘highly exploratory, aiming 
to inform decisions about which of many weak possibili-
ties to pursue with focused efforts’. For such scenarios they 
advocate formal adjustments with hierarchical models, as 
illustrated by Greenland [4] and Witte et al. [5].
We agree with GH that our proposed informal adjustment 
may not always be appropriate, and that there are situations 
where a more formal approach may be preferable. How-
ever, we note that a formal adjustment may quickly become 
unmanageable. For instance, real epidemiological studies 
often contain a large number of ‘primary analyses’, ‘second-
ary analyses’, ‘sensitivity analyses’ and so forth, not to men-
tion all other aspects of the analyses that entail more or less 
implicit multiplicity issues, such as model selection, variable 
selection etc. Furthermore, some of these may be presented 
in the main text of the paper, whereas some may only be 
presented in online supplementary material, or just referred 
to as ‘carried out but not shown’. To put all these into one 
hierarchical model adds complexity and may not be realistic. 
Even worse, as shown in our paper the Bayesian framework 
suggests that adjustment should in principle be made for ‘all 
other tests in the world that are associated with the test under 
consideration’, which is clearly not possible with a single 
unifying model. Thus, even though formal adjustment may 
be possible, or even desirable, in contextually well-informed 
settings such as those in Greenland [4] and Witte et al. [5], 
without considerable effort to formalize this information 
accurately one will reach a point where formal treatment 
must give way to, or at least be complemented by, more 
informal considerations. In our opinion, one can come a long 
way in reporting and visualising the available evidence, as 
in a forest plot. This is useful regardless of whether the evi-
dence is also summarised, pooled or borrowed across results 
(as in hierarchical models), each of which tend to give more 
optimistic impressions of the available evidence (by extract-
ing additional information from a priori assumptions and/or 
other study results).
Information summary versus decision making
GH emphasize the distinction between information/evidence 
summary and decision making. He writes: ‘Unfortunately, 
much of the statistical literature (including SV) fails to dis-
tinguish between these two tasks.’ He further emphasizes the 
role of loss functions for multiple testing: ‘Loss functions 
are central to justifying any conclusive statement about a 
relation. Whether a claim is of no effect, or harm, or benefit, 
it entails an implicit belief that the conclusion is justified 
because the cost of being mistaken (which is always a risk) 
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is less than the cost of being inconclusive or incorrectly con-
cluding something else.’
We agree with GH that the distinction between informa-
tion/evidence summary and decision making is important, 
and that loss functions are essential for the latter. However, 
in our experience the confusion surrounding multiple test-
ing is almost exclusively related to information/evidence 
summary, and this was also the sole focus on our paper. 
We believe that this is pretty clear from how the paper was 
written. For instance, we wrote [just below equation (2)]: ‘...
if the posterior probability is greater than 0.5, then the alter-
native hypothesis is more probable than the null hypothesis, 
so it would be rational to believe in the alternative, i.e. to 
estimate that 휃f  is equal to 1.’ (Emphasis added). Thus, our 
paper is considered with beliefs per se, not about acting on 
these beliefs. In particular, we did not discuss how to make 
decisions (based on posterior probabilities) in light of the 
costs of decision errors.
To put this in the context of Bygren et al. [3], consider 
Table 1 from our paper. The controversy around this table 
can be formulated like this: ‘Given the seven non-significant 
p values in this table, is it rational to believe that epigenetic 
effects are truly present in the stratum of paternal grand-
mother/female grandchild, where a significant p value was 
found?’ This question is about evidence, not about decisions. 
Thus, our answer to this question should not depend on what 
potential (e.g. political, medical etc) consequences it may 
have to ‘formally declare’ (e.g. in the title of a scientific 
paper, as in Bygren et al. [3]) that we do or do not believe 
in epigenetic effects.
Hierarchical models
GH strongly advocate the use of hierarchical models for han-
dling multiplicity problems. They say: ‘hierarchical mod-
eling provides a coherent framework for fine-tuning models 
to maximize valid information (signals) in the compressed 
data while minimizing random artefacts (noise)’.
We agree that hierarchical models are often useful, but we 
believe that they only go half-way in providing solutions to 
the more logical/philosophical problems with multiple test-
ing. To see why, consider the paper by Witte et al. [5], which 
GH put forward as a prominent example of a hierarchical 
model analysis. In this paper, the authors studied the asso-
ciations between 12 food items (e.g. cauliflower, tomato) 
and breast cancer. They first used a conventional logistic 
regression on the form
where Y is a cancer indicator and 퐗 is a vector of consumed 
food items. Witte et al. [5] included covariates (e.g. age, 
body mass index) in the model as well; for simplicity we 
ignore covariates here. The vector of food coefficients 훽 is 
logit{p(Y = 1|퐗)} = 훼 + 훽퐗,
the target parameter. Fitting this model with standard maxi-
mum likelihood gave quite disparate estimates, with positive 
coefficients for some food items, but negative coefficients for 
other. The authors commented on this by saying ‘a priori we 
expected all foods to be either inversely associated or not 
associated with breast cancer owing to their known constitu-
ents’ potential anticarcinogenic properties’. They proceeded 
by fitting a hierarchical model, in which the food coefficients 
were modeled as
where 휋 is a vector of fixed parameters and 훿 is a random 
error term, assumed to have a normal distribution with mean 
0 and fixed assumed variance 휏2 . The matrix 퐙 contains food 
constituents that may contribute to dietary effects on breast 
cancer (e.g. glucosinolates, fiber), so that element zij of 퐙 
is the amount of constituent j in food item i. When fitting 
this hierarchical model, the estimated food coefficients 
were ‘shrunk’ towards each others, which then, presuma-
bly, would indicate that a multiplicity adjustment has taken 
place.
The amount of shrinkage in the estimated food coeffi-
cients depends on two things; the relative dimensions of 
휋 and 훽 , and the assumed variance of 훿 . If the dimension 
of 휋 is small, relative to the dimension of 훽 , then the food 
coefficients are projected into a smaller subspace, so that 
there will be large shrinkage. If, in addition, the variance 
of 훿 is small, then the food coefficients are prevented from 
varying within this subspace, which will further increase the 
shrinkage. An extreme case occurs when 휋 is a scalar and the 
variance of delta is assumed to be 0, in which case maximal 
shrinkage occurs.
Now, suppose for pedagogical reasons that there are 
equally many constituents and food item (i.e. 12). Suppose 
further that, as it turns out, each food item only contains one 
constituent, and each constituent only appears in one food 
item, i.e. that 퐙 is a diagonal matrix, so that 훽i = zij휋i . In 
this case, the dimensions of 훽 and 휋 are identical, and there 
will be no shrinkage, regardless of the assumed variance 
of 훿 . Thus, the researcher is left without any guidance on 
whether and how to do multiplicity adjustment, since the 
hierarchical model will not do that for him. If the researcher 
nevertheless proceeds by using a hierarchical model in this 
case (or just an ordinary regression model, since the hierar-
chical model didn’t suggest adjustment anyway), and reports 
the unadjusted p values from the fitted model, then a pure 
frequentist could launch the same critique as Häggström [6] 
did against Bygren et al. [3] (‘with so many unadjusted tests, 
there is a large risk that you have obtained at least one false 
positive’), without being able to articulate where the poor 
researcher should have drawn the line between relevant and 
irrelevant adjustments.
훽 = 휋퐙 + 훿,
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However, by using ‘fully’ Bayesian arguments, the 
neglect to adjust for multiplicity may be justifiable. If we 
have no reason to believe that different food items should 
have similar effects on breast cancer, except if they happen 
to share any of the 12 constituents that we have listed, and if 
the ‘residual association’ due to dependent data (represented 
by the dashed double-headed arrow in our Figure 2) is weak, 
then it makes perfect sense from a Bayesian perspective to 
not adjust for multiplicity, since the posterior distribution 
for each particular food coefficient is roughly unchanged by 
such adjustment.
Context and causality
GH emhasize the need for contextual information in mul-
tiplicity problems. They write: ‘context immersion, not 
mathematical statistics, is essential to specify a contextually 
sensible point between the poor extreme of no adjustment 
and the absurd and impossible extreme of adjustment for 
everything. In this regard, any failure of a method to for-
mally specify the adjustment set is an honest response to a 
question that cannot be sensibly answered by using abstract, 
decontextualized statistical rules’.
We believe that GH, perhaps unintentionally, make a poor 
caricature of our view here. We have never claimed that 
context is unimportant, or that contextual thinking can be 
replaced by automatized rules. On the contrary, we have 
emphasized (see for instance Section ‘Practical implica-
tions’) how utterly important contextual reasoning is in 
multiplicity problems. What we have claimed though, is 
that (1) the Bayesian framework offers a principled way of 
incorporating contextual information whereas the frequentist 
framework does not, and (2) from the Bayesian perspective, 
contextual information only matters insofar that it influences 
the joint prior distributions of parameters/hypotheses.
The second point does not mean that the analyst needs 
to specify, or make a guess about, joint priors directly. In 
many situations it would be more natural to derive these 
from more fundamental relations, either through a formal 
(e.g. hierarchical) model, or through informal reasoning. 
For instance, as GH point out, causal considerations are 
important in many practical problems, even if the research 
question is non-causal, since underlying causal structures 
may explain why and to what extent we should consider 
parameters/hypotheses a priori associated.
Regarding causality, GH make an analogy between 
multiplicity adjustment and confounding adjustment. They 
write: ‘to claim that every comparison should be adjusted 
for every other comparison (even comparisons never car-
ried out by the analyst) is as detached from reality as 
claiming that every causal analysis of an observed asso-
ciation between two variables must adjust for every con-
ceivable shared cause of the variables going back to start 
of our universe.’ Presumably, the part about ‘adjusting for 
every other comparison’ is intended to describe our view, 
which we again believe is a poor caricature. One of the 
main messages of our paper is that the Bayesian perspec-
tive relieves the analyst from many multiplicity adjust-
ments that may seem intuitively necessary (see Section 
‘Data fishing and the intention of the researcher’).
Nevertheless, we do believe that the analogy with con-
founding adjustment is useful, as it pinpoints the need for 
a principled framework, as well as the need to distinguish 
between principles and pragmatic practice. Today, there 
is an overwhelming consensus that causal diagrams offer 
a principled framework for confounder selection, and that 
causal diagrams are immensely helpful to structure thinking 
about which covariate adjustments are relevant and which 
are not [7–12]. We believe that the Bayesian framework has 
a similar pedagogical value for multiple testing problems. 
However, as GH allude to, if one would meticulously draw 
a causal diagram for a real epidemiological scenario, aiming 
to include all covariates that would in principle be relevant to 
adjust for, one would quickly come to a point where adjust-
ment for these becomes unmanageable, simply because there 
would be too many. Similarly, we argue in our paper that the 
Bayesian framework may suggest an extremely large set set 
of multiplicity adjustments. This does not deprive either tool 
of its pedagogical value though; what it means is simply that 
we have to find a reasonable compromise between adjusting 
for everything and adjusting for nothing, and perhaps also 
between formal and informal adjustment. However, before 
this can be done, one needs a principled framework to dis-
tinguish between relevant and irrelevant adjustments, so that 
we at least know what we would do in a ‘perfect world’ not 
hampered by practical considerations.
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